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Abstract
Background: Privacy legislation in most jurisdictions allows the disclosure of health data for secondary purposes without
patient consent if it is de-identified. Some recent articles in the medical, legal, and computer science literature have argued
that de-identification methods do not provide sufficient protection because they are easy to reverse. Should this be the
case, it would have significant and important implications on how health information is disclosed, including: (a) potentially
limiting its availability for secondary purposes such as research, and (b) resulting in more identifiable health information
being disclosed. Our objectives in this systematic review were to: (a) characterize known re-identification attacks on health
data and contrast that to re-identification attacks on other kinds of data, (b) compute the overall proportion of records that
have been correctly re-identified in these attacks, and (c) assess whether these demonstrate weaknesses in current de-
identification methods.
Methods and Findings: Searches were conducted in IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, and PubMed. After screening,
fourteen eligible articles representing distinct attacks were identified. On average, approximately a quarter of the records
were re-identified across all studies (0.26 with 95% CI 0.046–0.478) and 0.34 for attacks on health data (95% CI 0–0.744).
There was considerable uncertainty around the proportions as evidenced by the wide confidence intervals, and the mean
proportion of records re-identified was sensitive to unpublished studies. Two of fourteen attacks were performed with data
that was de-identified using existing standards. Only one of these attacks was on health data, which resulted in a success
rate of 0.00013.
Conclusions: The current evidence shows a high re-identification rate but is dominated by small-scale studies on data that
was not de-identified according to existing standards. This evidence is insufficient to draw conclusions about the efficacy of
de-identification methods.
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Introduction
The availability of de-identified data has been critical for
population health research, health services research, and public
health. De-identification is the act of reducing the information
content in data to decrease the probability of discovering an
individual’s identity. Over the past several decades, a number of
different metrics and methods have been developed, and applied,
to de-identify data [1]. De-identification has become a key
component of various privacy statutes and regulations, especially
in the context of health data [2,3]. These provide strong incentives
for its application when person-specific information is disclosed for
secondary purposes (i.e., purposes beyond the initial reason for
data collection). Additionally, in the context of health research,
many institutional review boards will waive the consent require-
ment if the data is de-identified [4,5].
Yet, there is a growing view that there has been a failure of de-
identification [6,7]. In particular, it has been claimed that data can
be re-identified with relative ease, thus casting doubt on the ability
to protect personal information from privacy invasions. This
argument has been invoked to substantiate calls for legislative and
regulatory changes in court cases [8] and in the peer-reviewed
scientific literature [9,10,11,12].
The importance of this claim cannot be overstated because
there are significant policy implications at stake. Should there be a
failure of de-identification, there would be at least three
consequences on the practice of disclosing data for secondary
purposes, such as health research [13]: (i) it may be necessary to
obtain consent or authorization from patients before disclosure, (ii)
there would be less incentive to de-identify data, and (iii) the
likelihood of data breaches would increase. None of these are ideal
outcomes.
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when possible, it is not always practical to do so, especially
retrospectively for data already collected for a different purpose
[14]. Without consent and without an acceptable method for de-
identification, data custodians are likely to become increasingly
reluctant to disclose health data at all. Even when consent can be
obtained, the disparity between consenters and non-consenters is
significant. These two groups differ in demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, resulting in biased data sets [15,16,17].
Secondly, if there is reduced incentive to de-identify health data
when it is disclosed to serve important societal needs, more
identifiable information will be disclosed instead [13]. It would be
a greater risk to patient privacy if more identifiable information is
disclosed when de-identified information would have satisfied the
purpose.
Thirdly, if more identifiable data are disclosed for secondary
purposes, there are real dangers from data breaches. The number
of records affected by breaches is already quite high: the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has reported
252 breaches at health information custodians (e.g., clinics and
hospitals) each involving more than 500 records from the end of
September 2009 to the end of 2010 [18]. In all, the records of over
7.8 million patients have been exposed. If there are no
requirements to de-identify data, society risks an avalanche of
data breaches involving identifiable information requiring notifi-
cation of the affected patients. A rising number of data breach
notifications will erode the public’s trust in data custodians
[19,20].
The argument that data is readily susceptible to re-identification
is not new. In the 1990’s, there was a well-publicized re-
identification attack on a claims database containing information
on 135,000 patients disseminated by the Group Insurance
Commission [21]. In that attack, the discharge record for the
then Governor of Massachusetts was re-identified using simple
demographic information found in the Cambridge voter registra-
tion list which was purchased for $20. This was possible because
certain fields in the two databases matched, namely: date of birth,
5-digit residential ZIP code, and gender. Since then, other
examples of re-identification attacks have been reported on quite
heavily by the media, including those of the web search queries of
over a half-million America Online (AOL) clients [22] and the
movie reviews of a half-million Netflix subscribers [23].
At first glance, it seems as if there are examples demonstrating a
failure of de-identification. However, there has been no formal
investigation to assess this evidence, and in particular, to contrast
the re-identification attacks on health data with other types of
data. Given the sensitivity of health information and potential
implications for health policy (for example see [24]), it is critical to
appraise the evidence in this domain.
We therefore performed a systematic review to: (a) characterize
known re-identification attacks on health data and contrast that to
re-identification attacks on other kinds of data, (b) compute the
overall proportion of records that have been correctly re-identified
in these attacks, and (c) assess whether these demonstrate a failure
of current de-identification methods.
Methods
We performed a systematic review of the relevant evidence
demonstrating successful re-identification attacks on data sets that
may have had some transformations applied to hide the
individuals’ identity. We examined articles from a wide array of
communities reporting on such attacks, including statistics,
computer science, and health informatics.
Search Method
Articles in the statistical disclosure control literature, computer
science literature, and medical informatics literature were searched
by KEE and EJ using the general terms ‘‘anonymization’’, ‘‘de-
identification’’, and ‘‘re-identification’’ indexed before the end of
October 2010. Broad search terms were chosen to ensure that we
did not miss any relevant publications. The searches were
performed on PubMed, IEEE Xplore (the on-line library of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) and the ACM
Digital Library (the on-line library of the Association for
Computing Machinery), and the records for all relevant English
language articles were obtained for further consideration. The
IEEE and ACM publish and index a significant amount of the
computer science and medical informatics research work. The
resulting set of articles was augmented with articles known to the
authors, identified through targeted searches on Google Scholar
(e.g., for specific authors), and articles identified through the
reference lists of the included studies. Technical reports and
presentations were also included.
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
In total 1498 articles were identified from the databases and 24
from other sources. The article titles, keywords and abstracts were
screened, where the primary inclusion criterion was that an article
described a re-identification attack on an actual data set or a
quantitative re-identification risk assessment. While we are mostly
interested in the former, we included the latter during screening
because it is often difficult to distinguish between the two types of
articles from a title, keywords, and abstract.
To evaluate the accuracy of the screening, we performed an
inter-rater reliability analysis with two independent raters. After
the first rater completed his screening (KEE), a second rater not
involved in the study in any way was recruited (KA). We went
through the study objectives and screening criteria with the second
rater to ensure consistency. For deciding how many articles
needed to be rated we performed a power analysis for using the
Kappa statistic [25] given an expected effect size of 0.8 at a power
of 80% [26,27]. We therefore required 18 articles to be screened
by the second rater. We randomly selected 9 articles that were
screened in by the first rater and 9 that were screened out by the
first rater. The value of Kappa was found to be 0.85 (2-sided
p,0.001).
Records that passed screening were obtained and assessed for
eligibility through a full-text review. Articles were considered
eligible if they went beyond a risk assessment and actually re-
identified individuals. Studies which evaluated the risk of re-
identification but did not attempt to re-identify any individuals
were excluded (even if it was plausible in theory to re-identify
individuals, if actual re-identification was not demonstrated then
the article was excluded), for example, see [28,29,30,31] for
articles that were excluded. Furthermore, simulated attack studies,
on artificial or real data, were excluded if they did not re-identify
individuals.
We did not limit the selected articles to those that examined
health data, but we did exclude studies examining the re-
identification of genomic information. There is evidence that
raw genomic information and summary statistics can distinguish
individuals [32,33,34], and existing de-identification methods do
not provide strong privacy guarantees [35]. Therefore, the
assessment of re-identification risk from genomic information
remains an active area of research [36].
The full-text of articles that made it through the two stage
screening process were reviewed and abstracted. Two of the
authors (KEE and EJ) characterized every article and where there
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reached for the final rating.
Data Abstraction
The following six criteria were used to summarize each eligible
study: (a) inclusion of health data in the attack, (b) the profession of
the adversary, (c) country of re-identification, (d) the proportion or
number of individuals re-identified, (e) whether the de-identifica-
tion of the original data followed existing standards, and (f)
whether the re-identification was verified. The first four criteria
are descriptive, and characterize the nature and scope of successful
re-identification attacks, whereas the latter two are quality
indicators for the attack. These criteria were reviewed by a panel
of five privacy experts, and were presented to a dozen privacy
practitioners to solicit their feedback. While not comprehensive,
these criteria were believed to provide a necessary foundation to
understand and judge the nature of the re-identification attacks.
3.1 Inclusion of health data. There tend to be sector-
specific health privacy laws in many jurisdictions, arguably,
resulting in health information being better protected than other
types of information. Also, not all data sets are structurally the
same. Each type of data set requires its own de-identification and
re-identification methods. A re-identification attack on health
information would therefore carry more weight in demonstrating
the real-world risk of re-identification of health data.
3.2 The profession of the adversary. Who is re-identifying
data sets helps characterize the degree to which re-identification
attacks are widespread. For example, if many different professions
of adversaries are launching successful re-identification attacks and
they vary in skill and resources, then this may indicate the ease
with which re-identification attacks can occur.
3.3 The country of re-identification. This refers to both the
country of the adversary and the country where the individuals
covered by the data come from. This characteristic is important
because some countries make population databases readily
available for free or for a modest fee. A good example of such
publicly available population databases are state-level voter
registration databases in the US [37]. There is also a thriving
industry specializing in the creation and sale of databases
containing personal information about the population, making a
successful re-identification attack on a de-identified data set more
likely [38].
3.4 The percentage/number of individuals re-
identified. The percentage (or number if no denominator is
provided) of individuals re-identified is an indication of the severity
of the re-identification attack. If a large percentage of records in a
database were re-identified then it is a more severe attack than if a
single individual has been re-identified, for example.
3.5 The de-identification of the original data followed
existing standards. If a data set that has not been de-identified
in a defensible way is subsequently re-identified, then a successful
re-identification attack on that data is not informative about how
well the de-identification worked. Therefore, the method of de-
identification is important to consider.
The US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule provides the most precise description of
how to de-identify data among privacy laws in the US and
Canada. In fact, the provisions of HIPAA have been applied in
other jurisdictions. For example, health research organizations in
Canada choose to use HIPAA standards to de-identify data sets
[39], Canadian sites conducting research funded by US agencies
need to comply with HIPAA [40], and international guidelines for
the public disclosure of clinical trials data have relied on HIPAA
definitions [41].
There are two de-identification standards specified in the
HIPAA Privacy Rule: (a) the Safe Harbor standard, and (b) the
statistical standard [3]. The former standard is quite precise in that
it specifies 18 data elements that must be removed (e.g., patient
names, full dates, and full ZIP code). These 18 elements are
provided in Table 1. The latter standard requires that: (a) a
statistical expert performs the de-identification, (b) the risk of re-
identification is ‘‘very low’’, and (c) the de-identification method is
documented. Both standards ensure that the risk of re-identifica-
tion is low, but not zero.
While these two standards are not perfect, their application
would provide some assurance that a generally accepted and
broadly reviewed methodology was used to de-identify the data. If
a standard was not used then it is not possible to know whether the
de-identification applied on a data set provided meaningful
protection against re-identification.
Therefore, the criterion we use to decide when a data set is
defensibly de-identified is if it meets either of the two standards in
the US HIPAA Privacy Rule. We will refer to this as ‘‘standards-
based de-identification’’.
3.6 Re-identification has been verified. Once the
adversary has re-identified a record, the adversary should verify
that the re-identification is correct using additional information.
Verification may be simple to do in a demonstration attack where
the data custodian has the correct identities associated with the
records and can verify each re-identified record. On the other
hand, verification may require contacting the re-identified
individual directly to confirm the facts (e.g., that the individual
has the disease or condition that is indicated in the attacked
database), or contacting the re-identified individual’s work, school,
co-workers, family, or neighbors. In some situations verification
can be indirect. For example, if a re-identification attack reveals
sensitive health information about a famous person and that
person does not deny the sensitive information, then that may be
taken as indirect verification.
Verification of re-identification attacks is important for three
reasons. First, re-identification is probabilistic. Even if the
probability of a correct re-identification is high, a re-identification
attack is not successful unless some means have been used to verify
the correctness of that re-identification. It is likely that an
adversary would find multiple records that match the target
individual and would choose one of these with equal probability.
However, it is not possible to know with certainty if the chosen
record is the correct one without verification.
Second, real data sets have quality problems. For example, a
date of birth may be entered incorrectly into a database, or the
digits in a ZIP code transposed. Such data errors may result in a
potential re-identification being incorrect, even if all of the
characteristics of the individual and the fields in the record match
exactly. Only verification will indicate whether or not the re-
identification was correct.
Third, background information that the adversary uses for re-
identification may be old or cover a different time period than that
contained in the attacked data set. Data aging or period mismatch
may mean that seemingly correct matches are incorrect. In such
cases, verification of the re-identified individuals is critical to
ensure correctness.
Mean Re-identification Rate
The main outcome from a re-identification attack is the re-
identification rate: the proportion of records that were correctly re-
identified. We used a chi-squared test to determine if the study
proportions pi~xi=ni were homogeneous, where xi is the number
of re-identified records, and ni the database size, for study i. If they
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attacks as coming from the same general attack, thus estimating
the overall proportion of re-identification attacks as simply
^ p p~
P
i
xi
 
P
i
ni, known as the equal effects estimator. Otherwise,
if they were not homogeneous, we would use the random-effects
estimator proposed by Laird and Mosteller [42].
Publication Bias
Re-identification attacks with a low re-identification rate are less
likely to be published for two reasons: (a) it is less likely that an
adversary will attempt to attack a data set with a low probability of
correct re-identification, and (b) attacks that are performed and
result in a low success rate are less likely to be published. We
examine these two points below.
The overall probability of actual correct re-identification can be
expressed as [43]:
pr re{identification ðÞ
~pr re{identification attempt j ðÞ |pr attempt ðÞ
ð1Þ
Thismeansthat theoverallprobabilityofsuccessfulre-identification
will depend on whether an adversary will attempt a re-identification
to start off with. For the studies included in our review we know that
pr attempt ðÞ ~1. However, it is generally assumed that if the
likelihood of successful re-identification is small then this would act
as a deterrent for an adversary to attempt re-identification to start
off with (i.e., if pr re{identification attempt j ðÞ is low then
pr attempt ðÞ is also low) [43,44]. By this reasoning, there will be
fewer attacks attempted on data sets that have a very low likelihood
of being re-identified by an adversary, such as those that have been
de-identified using existing standards. The implication then is that
we expect fewer studies with a low success rate to be published
because they wouldn’t be attempted.
If an adversary does attempt an attack, re-identification attacks
with lower success rates are less likely to be published because, we
would speculate, they are perceived by authors or journal and
newspaper editors as less interesting.
On the other hand, an adversary may not wish to reveal a
highly successful re-identification attack if the purpose of the attack
is questionable. For example, one anecdote claimed that a banker
used confidential information provided in loan applications to re-
identify patients in a cancer registry with outstanding loans [45] -
the details of such an attack would be unlikely to be published.
Even if an attack was for demonstration or evaluation purposes, it
may reveal that data were not sufficiently de-identified and the
data custodian may not wish to reveal that fact.
If less successful attacks are less likely to be attempted or
published, it would raise the overall mean proportion of records
re-identified in our review. If more successful attacks are less likely
to be published, it would reduce the overall mean proportion of
records re-identified.
To examine these effects further, we computed the number of
studies that would need to be performed and published to
significantly change our mean proportion of records re-identified.
This is similar to the computation of a failsafe N value to
determine how many unpublished studies with null outcomes
would be needed to change the significance of the results in a
meta-analysis [46,47]. In our analysis, instead of a single null
outcome, we examined the sensitivity to a range of values for the
proportion of records re-identified. We compared the number of
studies required to change the mean proportion of records re-
Table 1. The 18 elements in the HIPAA Privacy Rule Safe Harbor standard that must be removed or generalized for a data set to be
considered de-identified (see 45 CFR 164.514(b)(2)(i)).
The following identifiers of the individual or of relatives, employers, or household members of the individual, are removed:
(A) Names;
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three
digits of a zip code if, according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census: (1) The geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with
the same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and (2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic units containing 20,000 or fewer
people is changed to 000.
(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages over
89 and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
(D) Telephone numbers;
(E) Fax numbers;
(F) Electronic mail addresses;
(G) Social security numbers;
(H) Medical record numbers;
(I) Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(J) Account numbers;
(K) Certificate/license numbers;
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers;
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(O) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
(Q) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
(R) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.t001
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of-thumb provided in the literature of 5|kz10, where k is the
number of studies included in the analysis [46,47].
We also evaluated publication bias using a funnel plot on the
proportion of records re-identified [48]. This showed the
proportion of records correctly re-identified against the standard
error [49].
Results
Figure 1 depicts a PRISMA diagram (Preferred Reporting Items
for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) for this review [50,51],
and Checklist S1 contains the completed PRISMA checklist. We
identified fourteen relevant studies as summarized in Table 2
according to our six criteria described in the ‘‘Methods’’ section.
Notable Observations
There are several notable observations from our review and the
summary table that should be highlighted:
1. Some studies did not report the attack
methodology. Four re-identification attacks only reported the
results briefly and had little description of the methodology used:
one highly cited result was mentioned in passing as part of another
study [21], an influential result had its methodology sealed as part
of a court case [52], one was mentioned in an affidavit in a court
case by a government official with no supporting information [53],
and another example often cited by researchers and policy makers
was described in a newspaper article with little description of the
precise methodology followed [22]. The remaining 10 studies had
more complete descriptions of their attack methodology.
2 Few attacks involve health data. Six of the fourteen re-
identification attacks involved health data. Even though they may
influence the general perception of re-identification risk, successful
re-identification attacks on other types of data (e.g., Internet search
engine queries, movie ratings data, and relationships on social
networks) do not necessarily translate into a real risk to health
data, as opposed to successful re-identification attacks on health
data.
3. Most adversaries were researchers. Eleven of the
fourteen successful re-identification attacks were performed by
researchers to demonstrate that a risk exists or to evaluate if one
exists, but not to exploit that risk (i.e., demonstration attacks). Only
two of the fourteen attacks were conducted to inform a decision.
These two re-identification attacks were on health data and both
Figure 1. PRISMA diagram. PRISMA diagram summarizing the steps involved in the systematic review of the re-identification attack literature.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.g001
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journalists who wrote a newspaper article which resulted in the
departure of the CTO at the data custodian, the dismissal of the
individual responsible for the disclosure, and the data custodian
not disclosing other data afterwards [54,55]. Four out of the six
health data attacks were performed by researchers.
4. Most re-identification attacks were in the US. Ten of
the attacks were performed by US-based investigators on data
about or that included US citizens. This likely reflects a larger
research community working on identifiability in the US and a
greater availability of public and semi-public information for
launching re-identification attacks. Four of the six re-identification
attacks on health data were on US patient data, and two on
Canadian patient data. The success of re-identification attacks will
be jurisdiction-dependent because of variation in the availability of
public and semi-public registers to use for matching. Successful
attacks in the US will not necessarily succeed in other regions.
5. Most re-identification attacks were verified. Eleven
out of the fourteen studies, a significant proportion, did in fact verify
their matches. All attacks on health data were verified. This is
encouraging because it suggests thoroughness of work in this area.
6. Most re-identified data was not de-identified according
to existing standards. Only two of the studies were attacks on
data de-identified in accordance with existing standards
[56,57,58]. The remaining twelve attacks were committed
against data that was left in varying degrees of an identifiable
state, which only demonstrates that improperly de-identified data
can be re-identified. Only one of the six re-identification attacks on
health data was on a data set that was de-identified according to
one of the existing standards, and it was found that the risk of re-
identification was very low [57,58].
The final point is best illustrated through several representative
examples. First, recall the case of the re-identification of the
Massachusetts governor. The information leveraged for re-
identification was the date of birth, gender, and 5-digit residential
ZIP code. These three features were not modified in any way prior
to dissemination, which means that the claims database would not
meet the Safe Harbor standard for de-identification. Second, AOL
disclosed Internet search data on more than 675,000 of its users on
a public website after replacing the users’ names with persistent
pseudonyms, but performed no de-identification of the search
queries themselves. New York Times reporters were then able to
determine the identity of a single individual in the data set from
her search queries. However, the queries of the user in question
included her town name and even her personal name. It is known
that individuals often run search queries on their own names (i.e.,
Table 2. A summary of successful re-identification attacks on the evaluation criteria.
ID Study
Pub
Year
1
Health data
included?
Profession of
adversary
Number of
individuals
re-identified
Country of
adversary
Proper
de-identification
of attacked data ?
Re-identification
verified ?
A [70] 2001 No Researchers 29 of 273 Germany ‘‘Factually anonymous’’ Yes (records
containing insurance
numbers only)
B [71] 2001 No Researchers 75% of 11,000 USA Direct identifiers removed No
C [67] 2002 Yes Researcher 1 of 135,000 USA Removal of names
and addresses
Yes
[56] 2003 No Researchers 219 unique matches,
112 with 2 possibilities,
8 confirmed
UK Yes Verified matches,
but not identities
D [22] 2006 No Journalist 1 of 657,000 USA No Yes (with individual)
E [72] 2006 Yes Researchers 79% of 550 USA No Verified (with
original data set)
[73] 2006 No Researchers Of 133 users, 60%
of those who mention
at least 8 movies
USA Direct identifiers
removed
No
F [52] 2006 Yes Expert Witness 18 of 20 USA Only type of cancer, zip
code and date of diagnosis
included in request
Yes (verified by
the Department
of Health)
G [74] 2007 No Researchers 2,400 of 4.4 million USA Identifying information
removed
Verified using
original data
[53] 2007 Yes Broadcaster 1 Canada Direct Identifiers removed
& possibly other unknown
de-id methods used
Yes
H [23] 2008 No Researchers 2 of 50 USA Direct identifiers
removed+maybe perturbation
No
I [75] 2009 Yes Researcher 1 of 3,510 Canada Direct identifiers removed Yes
J [76] 2009 No Researchers 30.8% of 150
pairs of nodes
USA Identifying
information removed
Verified using
ground-truth
mapping of the 2
networks
K [57,58]
??? 2010 Yes Researchers 2 of 15,000 USA Yes - HIPAA Safe Harbor Yes
(1This is the first year that the report or article appears. Some of the reports we cite have been updated at later dates. Some reports describe re-identification attacks
that may have occurred in earlier years. Since the appearance of the original results in 2010 a second article has been published more recently).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.t002
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from the queries themselves [59,60,61,62,63], which makes it
somewhat trivial to re-identify individuals from search queries.
Third, the court case between the Southern Illinoisan newspaper
and the public health department revolved around a cancer
registry that included the patients’ 5-digit ZIP code, which would
not pass the Safe Harbor standard [52]. Finally, Netflix made a
database of a sample of its subscribers’ movie ratings publicly
available for a data mining competition. The authors of the Netflix
re-identification attack themselves stated that they believed very
little perturbation or other form of de-identification was performed
on the movie ratings data before they were disclosed [23]. In
addition, there were dates included in the data set, which would
make it fail the Safe Harbor standard.
Out of the fourteen attacks, in only two were the data de-
identified according to current standards [56,57,58]. In these
attacks, the risk of re-identification was found to be very low. In
the first case, the authors matched sample records from the UK
Census with records from the general household survey. The re-
identification risk from the sample census records had been
evaluated in detail by a team of statisticians, was known to be very
low, and was documented, and therefore meets the definition of
standards-based de-identification [43,64]. The survey data could
only be obtained under very strict confidentiality conditions. It is
important to recognize that neither set of records actually
communicated the individuals’ identities. Rather the authors of
the study verified their matches through the Office of National
Statistics which was privy to the corresponding individuals’
identities. It was not clear from this study what the exact
proportion of records that could be re-identified might be, but the
absolute number of matched records was small. The second case
was commissioned by HHS to determine the re-identification risk
of data de-identified using the HIPAA Safe Harbor standard. This
study indicated that 0.013% of the records could be correctly re-
identified, which was consistent with previous estimates of the
actual risk of re-identification under Safe Harbor [37,65,66].
Mean Re-identification Rate
Only 11 out of 14 studies clearly reported a denominator,
allowing us to compute the proportion of records re-identified. A
chi-squared test of homogeneity across the studies failed at an alpha
level of 0.05, indicating heterogeneity. Therefore a simple
combination of the proportions is not warranted. We instead used
the random-effects estimator proposed by Laird and Mosteller [42].
We believe that the intent of re-identification varied among
studies, in that some only wanted to prove that it could be done
and were therefore satisfied with re-identifying a single record
[22,67], whereas others were attempting to re-identify as many
records as possible in the database [52,57,58]. Random-effects
models take such between-studies variation into account (as
opposed to fixed-effects models), but could give more relative
weight to attacks on small databases compared to fixed-effects
models [68].
In the case of the random effects estimator we assume an infinite
population of pi’s, with mean mp and variance sp
2. We weight the
overall mean using the inverse of the within and between variance.
That is, the weight for study i is wi~1 
sp
2zsi
2    , where sp
2 is
the variance of the true pi’s , and si
2 is the sampling variance for
study i. The overall mean is therefore estimated by weighted
estimates of pi, such that ^ p pw~
P
i
^ p pi|wi
 
P
i
wi, with variance
estimate var ^ p pw ðÞ ~1
 
P
i
wi.
The confidence intervals for all studies that provided a
denominator are shown in the caterpillar plot of Figure 2, and
for only the health studies in the caterpillar plot of Figure 3.
Caterpillar plots show the differences in the proportion of records
re-identified among studies, and how they vary from (and affect)
the mean. The overall mean proportion of records re-identified for
all studies was 0.262 with 95% CI 0.046–0.478, and for re-
identification attacks on health data only was 0.338 with 95% CI
0–0.744. Given such high re-identification rates, it is not surprising
that there is a general belief that re-identification is easy. But also,
Figure 2. Caterpillar plot (all studies). Caterpillar plot of the individual mean and confidence intervals for all studies with overall mean
proportion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.g002
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indicating considerable uncertainty.
If we remove the studies that had performed standards-based
de-identification, then the overall mean proportion across the
remainder (the ones not performing standards-based de-identifi-
cation) was 0.288 (95% CI: 0.056–0.52) and for those on health
data only it was 0.42 (95% CI: 0–0.9). The proportion of records
that can be correctly re-identified when the data are not de-
identified using standards-based methods is quite high.
On the other hand, the single study which was performed on
health data that was de-identified using standards-based methods
found that only 0.013% of the records could be re-identified. The
proportion of records that can be correctly re-identified when the
data is de-identified using standards-based methods is very low.
Publication Bias
There was only one published re-identification attack on health
data that was de-identified using current standards, and it had a
low success rate. Possible explanations for the low publication rate
of studies that have a low success rate are that: (a) there were fewer
attacks attempted on data that has been de-identified using
existing standards, and (b) attacks with a low success rate are less
likely to be published.
Also twelve of fourteen studies were demonstration attacks
performed by highly qualified experts in the field, which would
mean that they would likely have higher success rates than those
that weren’t demonstration attacks. Although, as noted earlier, it is
not necessary that all attacks with high success rates will be
published, especially if they were not demonstration attacks since
there would be less incentive to publicize them.
To examine this more systematically, we computed the number
of unpublished studies with re-identification success rates below/
above the current mean proportion of records re-identified (i.e., the
^ p pw value) that would be needed to significantly decrease/increase
that ^ p pw value. Initially, we assumed that studies with a re-
identification success rate of 0.1 were done and not published. We
can see in Figure 4 that 23 studies would have to exist such that the
upper tail of the new 95% confidence interval would be below the
current mean of 0.262. Similarly, 65 studies with a success rate of
0.3 would need to exist such that the lower tail of the new 95%
confidence interval would be above the current mean of 0.262. A
graph is plotted for different values of assumed success rate for all
studies in Figure 4 and for health studies only in Figure 5. These
graphs show as a horizontal line the tolerance value, which reflects
the plausible number of unpublished studies (the ‘‘tolerance’’). If the
numberof studies is below the tolerancevalue then there is cause for
concern about the potential sensitivity of the results to unpublished
studies. In general we can see that under most conditions the mean
proportion value is sensitive to the existence of unpublished studies
that show lower or higher re-identification success rates.
Figure 6 is a funnel plot for published re-identification attacks.
This figure is consistent with considerable heterogeneity across
studies. As expected, there was significant variation in the
proportion of records that were re-identified for studies on small
databases (those with higher standard errors). Studies on larger
databases tended to have a small success rate (these are clustered
around the origin). There were no studies on large databases with
a high proportion of records re-identified. The same pattern is
amplified for health data in Figure 7. This may be because it is
difficult to re-identify many records in a large database (e.g., due to
expense and time, and the technical challenges of doing so), or
because large databases tend to be better de-identified and
therefore have a low re-identification probability.
Discussion
It is not surprising that policy makers believe that the success
rate from re-identification attacks is high. The overall success rate
for all re-identification attacks was approximately 26%, and 34%
for health data. However, these results mask a more nuanced
picture that makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions about the
ease of re-identification.
The confidence interval around the above estimates was large,
partially because many of the attacks were on small databases.
Figure 3. Caterpillar plot (health studies). Caterpillar plot of the individual mean and confidence intervals for health studies with overall mean
proportion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.g003
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numbers.
We found only two studies where the original data was de-
identified using current standards and for those the data was
successfully re-identified. Only one of these attacks was on health
data, and the percentage of records re-identified was 0.013%,
which would be considered a very low success rate.
The number of unpublished studies that need to exist for the
overall re-identification attack success rates to be shifted up or
down was found to be plausible, meaning that the results are
sensitive to unpublished attacks. Less successful attacks may not be
published if they are perceived as not interesting. More successful
attacks may not be published because they could potentially be
embarrassing or cause difficulties to the adversaries and/or data
custodians if exposed.
Finally, there was considerable heterogeneity among the studies.
This makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions from the
combined effect estimate of the proportion of records re-identified.
Figure 4. Senstivitiy (all studies). The number of new studies with success rates below/above the current mean that would need to be performed
to significantly change the current mean for all studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.g004
Figure 5. Sensitivity (health studies). The number of new studies with success rates below/above the current mean that would need to be
performed to significantly change the current mean for health studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.g005
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were slightly jittered to reveal overlap.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.g006
Figure 7. Funnel plot (health studies). Funnel plot showing the proportion of records re-identified in health studies against standard error. The
points were slightly jittered to reveal overlap.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071.g007
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attacks on large databases that have been de-identified following
existing standards, and success rates should be correlated with how
well de-identification was performed. Metrics for measuring the
extent of de-identification have been summarized elsewhere [69]. It
is only then that we will have an evidence-based understanding of
the extent to which de-identification protects against real attacks.
Meanwhile, the evidence suggests that it would be prudent for
data custodians to continue to de-identify their data using current
best practices. At the same time, due diligence should be applied:
data custodians should complement such technical privacy
protections with legal safeguards where appropriate, such as data
sharing agreements which prohibit re-identification attempts and
provide for accountability of one’s actions.
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